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A NOTE ON THE GROWTH OF THE DIMENSION IN COMPLETE SIMPLE
GAMES
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Abstract: The remoteness from a simple game to a weighted game can be measured by the concept of
the dimension or the more general Boolean dimension. It is known that both notions can be exponential
in the number of voters. For complete simple games it was only recently shown in [9] that the dimension
can also be exponential. Here we show that this is also the case for complete simple games with two types
of voters and for the Boolean dimension of general complete simple games, which was posed as an open
problem in [9].
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1. INTRODUCTION
Simple games can be viewed as binary yes/no voting systems in which a proposal is pitted
against the status quo. In the subclass of weighted games each voter has a non-negative weight
and a proposal is accepted if the weight sum of its supporters meets or exceeds a preset posi-
tive quota. The representation complexity of weighted games is rather low, which makes them
interesting candidates for real-world voting system. More precisely, for a weighted game it is
sufficient to list the weights of the n voters and the quota. Directly storing whether a proposal
would be accepted or rejected for each subset of the n voters would need 2n bits.1 However,
each simple game can be written as the intersection of a finite number of weighted games and
the smallest possible number is called the dimension of the simple game. Unfortunately, the
dimension can also be exponential in the number of voters, see e.g. [4, 11]. Complete simple
games lie in between the classes of simple and weighted games. Here the voters do not admit
weights but are completely ordered (which will be defined more precisely in the next section).
E.g. the voting rules of the Council of the European Union according to the Treaty of Lisbon can
be modeled as a non-weighted complete simple game. In [9] it was shown that the dimension
of a complete simple game can also be exponential in the number of voters. However, the stated
construction requires that the number of types of different voters also increases without bound.
Here we show that the dimension of a complete simple game can be also exponential in the
number of voters for just two different types of voters. If all voters are of the same type, then the
game is weighted, i.e., has a dimension of 1. The concept of the dimension and the intersection
of weighted games was generalized to, more general, Boolean combinations of weighted games,
see e.g. [1, 4]. For simple games the corresponding Boolean dimension can also be exponential
in the number of voters, see e.g. [1, 4]. Whether the Boolean dimension of a complete simple
game can also be exponential in the number of voters was posed as an open problem in [9].
1Also the restriction to minimal winning coalitions, which are introduced later on, do not decrease the represen-
tation complexity too much, since there can be
(
n
bn/2c
)
minimal winning coalitions.
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Here we answer this question by a construction and show that the Boolean dimension is poly-
nomially bounded in the number of shift minimal winning vectors and voters. We also answer
another open question from [9] and analyze possible restrictions on the weights that still allow a
representation of a complete simple game as the intersection of weighted games.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the necessary preliminaries. Our
results are presented in Section 3.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n voters. By 2N we denote the set {S : S ⊆ N} of all
subsets of N . We also call the elements S ∈ 2N coalitions.
Definition 2.1. A simple game is a mapping v : 2N → {0, 1} such that v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1,
and v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ T ⊆ N . Each coalition S ⊆ N with v(S) = 1 is called a
winning coalition and each coalition T ⊆ N with v(T ) = 0 is called a losing coalition. If S is
a winning coalition and all proper subsets of S are losing, then S is called a minimal winning
coalition. Similarly, we call a losing coalition a maximal losing coalition if all proper supersets
are winning. Given a simple game v, we denote the set of minimal winning coalitions byW and
the set of maximal losing coalitions by L.
A simple game is uniquely characterized by either its setW of minimal winning coalitions or
its set L of maximal losing coalitions.
Example 2.2. For n = 4 voters let v be the simple game with W = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}. The
corresponding set of winning coalitions is given byW and all coalitions of cardinality at least 3.
We have L = {{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}} and the other losing coalitions are those coalitions
of cardinality at most 1.
Definition 2.3. Given a simple game v, we write i A j (or j @ i) for two voters i, j ∈ N if
we have v
(
{i} ∪ S\{j}
)
≥ v(S) for all {j} ⊆ S ⊆ N\{i} and we abbreviate i A j, j A i
by ij. The simple game v is called complete (simple game) if the binary relation A is a total
(complete) preorder, i.e.
(1) i A i for all i ∈ N ,
(2) either i A j or j A i (including “i A j and j A i”) for all i, j ∈ N , and
(3) i A j, j A h implies i A h for all i, j, h ∈ N
holds.
We remark that the simple game from Example 2.2 is not complete. I.e., while we have 12
and 34, for each i ∈ {1, 2} and each j ∈ {3, 4} we have neither i A j nor i @ j.
Since is a equivalence relation we can partition the set of voters N into subsets N1, . . . , Nt
such that we have ij for all i, j ∈ Nh, where 1 ≤ h ≤ t, and ij implies the existence of an
integer 1 ≤ h ≤ t with i, j ∈ Nh. We call each set Nh an equivalence class (of voters) and t
the number of equivalence classes of voters. We also say that v has t types of voters. By ni we
denote the cardinality of Ni, where 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Given the equivalence classes of voters, we can
associate to each coalition S ⊆ N a vector m˜ = (m1, . . . ,mt) ∈ Nt via mi = #(S ∩Ni) for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ t. We also call m˜ the type of coalition S. While several coalitions can be associated
to the same vector, i.e. have the same types, they are either all winning or all losing, so that we
speak of winning or losing vectors, respectively.
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Definition 2.4. Let v be a complete simple game with equivalence classes Nh of voters for
1 ≤ h ≤ t. We call a vector m˜ = (m1, . . . ,mt) ∈ Nt, where 0 ≤ mh ≤ nh for 1 ≤ h ≤ t, a
winning vector if v(S) = 1, where S is an arbitrary subset ofN containing exactlymh elements
of Nh for 1 ≤ h ≤ t. Analogously, we call m˜ a losing vector if v(S) = 0.
W.l.o.g. we will always assume that for a complete simple game the equivalence classes of
voters are ordered such that we have l A l′ for all l ∈ Ni and all l′ ∈ Nj with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ t.
The minimal winning vectors for Example 2.2 are (2, 0) and (0, 2). There is a unique maximal
losing vector (1, 1) and the additional losing vectors are given by (0, 0), (1, 0), and (0, 1).
Definition 2.5. Let v be a complete simple game. We call a minimal winning coalition S shift
minimal if for every other winning coalition S′ with {i} = S\S′ and {j} = S′\S we have
i @ j. Similarly, we call a maximal losing coalition T shift maximal if for every other losing
coalition T ′ with {i} = T\T ′ and {j} = T ′\T we have i A j. Now let S be an arbitrary
coalition and m˜ = (# (S ∩N1) , . . . ,#(S ∩Nt)) be the corresponding vector. We call m˜ shift
minimal winning if S is shift minimal winning and we call m˜ shift maximal losing if S is shift
maximal losing.
In words, a coalition is a shift minimal winning coalition, if the coalition is minimal winning
and the replacement of any voter by a strictly “weaker” (according to@) voter turns the coalition
into a losing one.
Let v be a complete simple game with t equivalence classes of voters. Based on the assumed
ordering of the equivalence classes N1, . . . , Nt we write a˜ := (a1, . . . , at)  (b1, . . . , bt) =: b˜
if
∑i
h=1 ah ≥
∑i
h=1 bh for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Assume a˜  b˜. If b˜ is a winning vector, then also a˜
has to be a winning vector, while it can happen that b˜ is losing and a˜ is winning. So, if m˜ is a
winning vector in v, then there exists a shift minimal winning vector m˜′ in v such that m˜  m˜′.
As an abbreviation, we write a˜  b˜ if a˜  b˜ and a˜ 6= b˜. Note that we can have a˜  b˜ and
b˜  a˜ if and only if a˜ = b˜.
Example 2.6. Let v be a simple game with t = 2 equivalence classes of voters N1 = {1, 2} and
N2 = {3, 4, 5, 6} such that a coalition S is winning if #(S ∩N1) ≥ 2 or #S ≥ 4. The minimal
vectors of v are given by (2, 0), (1, 3), and (0, 4). Since i A j for all i ∈ N1 and all j ∈ N2
the simple game v is complete and the shift minimal winning vectors are (2, 0) and (0, 4). Note
that (1, 3)  (0, 4), while we have neither (2, 0)  (1, 3) nor (1, 3)  (2, 0) . The unique shift
maximal losing vector is given by (1, 2).
Definition 2.7. A simple game v is weighted if there exists a quota q ∈ R>0 and weights
wi ∈ R≥0, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that v(S) = 1 iff w(S) :=
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q for every coalition
S ⊆ N . We also write v = [q;w1, . . . , wn].
Since wi ≥ wj implies i A j, every weighted game is complete, so that the simple game from
Example 2.2 is not weighted.
Definition 2.8. A sequence of coalitions
T = (X1, . . . , Xj ;Y1, . . . , Yj)
of a simple game v is called a trading transform of length j if
# {i : h ∈ Xi} = # {i : h ∈ Yi}
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for all h ∈ N . A trading transform T is called a certificate of non-weightedness for v if
X1, . . . , Xj are winning and Y1, . . . , Yj are losing coalitions.
The absence of a certificate of non-weightedness of any length is a necessary and sufficient
condition for the weightedness of a simple game v, see e.g. [11].
A certificate of non-weightedness for Example 2.6 is given by
({1, 2}, {3, 4}; {1, 3}, {2, 4})
and by
({1, 2}, {3, 4, 5, 6}; {1, 3, 4}, {2, 5, 6})
for Example 2.6.
Definition 2.9. Let v1, . . . , vd be d simple games with the same set of voters N . Their intersec-
tion v = v1 ∧ · · · ∧ vd is defined via v(S) = min {vi(S) : 1 ≤ i ≤ d} for all S ⊆ N . Similarly,
their union v = v1 ∨ · · · ∨ vd is defined via v(S) = max {vi(S) : 1 ≤ i ≤ d} for all S ⊆ N .
It can be easily checked that the intersection and the union of a list of simple games is a simple
game itself. It is well known that each simple game can be written as the intersection as well as
the union of a finite list of weighted games, see e.g. [11].
Definition 2.10. Let v be a simple game. The smallest integer d such that v is the intersection
of d weighted games is called the dimension of v. Similarly, the smallest number d of weighted
games such that v is the union of d weighted games is called the codimension of v.
The simple game of Example 2.2 can be written as
[2; 1, 1, 2, 0] ∧ [2; 1, 1, 0, 2] or [2; 1, 1, 0, 0] ∨ [2; 0, 0, 1, 1].
Since we already know that the game is not weighted, both the dimension and the codimension
are equal to 2. For the simple game from Example 2.6 we have the representations
[8; 5, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2] ∧ [8; 3, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2] and [2; 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0] ∨ [4; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
so that, again, both the dimension and the codimension are equal to 2.
A useful criterion for a lower bound for the dimension of a simple game is:
Lemma 2.11. ([6, Observation 1], [9, Theorem 1])
Let v be a simple game and let T1, . . . , Td be losing coalitions such that for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ j
there is no weighted game vi,j for which every winning coalition of v is winning in vi,j but Ti
and Tj are both losing in vi,j . Then, the dimension of v is at least d.
Definition 2.12. Let v1, . . . , vd be simple games. A Boolean combination of v1, . . . , vd is given
by v1 ∧ v′ or v1 ∨ v′, where v′ is a Boolean combination of v2, . . . , vd. For the special case
d = 1 we say that a simple game is a Boolean combination of itself. The Boolean dimension of
a simple game v is the smallest integer d such v is a Boolean combination of d weighted games
v1, . . . , vd.
In words, the Boolean dimension of a simple game v is the smallest number of weighted
games that are needed to express v by a logical formula connecting the weighted games using
∧ and ∨. As an example we mention that the voting rules of the Council of the European Union
according to the Treaty of Lisbon can be written as (v1∧v2)∨v3, where v1, v2, and v3 are suitable
weighted games. In [6] it was shown that the dimension is at least 7 and the codimension is at
least 2000, so that the Boolean dimension is indeed equal to 3.
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3. RESULTS
It is well known that the dimension of a simple game is upper bounded by the number #L of
maximal losing coalitions, see e.g. [11]. If there exists an equivalence class with many voters
this upper bound can be lowered:
Lemma 3.1. Let v be a simple game with t equivalence classes N1, . . . , Nt of voters and 1 ≤
i ≤ t be fix but arbitrary. For each maximal losing coalition S ∈ L let a(S) := # (S ∩Ni),
S′ = S\Ni, and the weighted game vS =
[
qS ;wS
]
be defined by
• qS = a+ 1;
• wj = 1 for all j ∈ Ni;
• wj = a+ 1 for all j ∈ N\ (S′ ∪Ni); and
• wj = 0 for all j ∈ S′.
With this, the intersection v′ of the weighted games vS for S ∈ L equals v.
PROOF. Let S be an arbitrary maximal losing coalition in v. Since wS(S) = a and qS = a+ 1
we have vS(S) = 0, so that v′(S) = 0 = v(S). Since v′ is a simple game any losing coalition
of v is also losing in v′. Now let T be an arbitrary winning coalition and S be an arbitrary
maximal losing coalition in v. Since T 6⊆ S there either exists a voter j ∈ T\Ni with j /∈ S or
#(T ∩Ni) ≥ a(S) + 1. In both cases we have wS(T ) ≥ a(S) + 1 = qS , so that vS(T ) = 1.
Thus, we have v′(T ) = 1 = v(T ), which then implies v′ = v. 
While we have constructed a weighted game vS for each maximal losing coalition S, we have
vS = vT if S\Ni = T\Ni and #(S ∩Ni) = # (T ∩Ni).
So, it is indeed possible to represent each complete simple game as the intersection of weighted
games where the voters of one arbitrary equivalence class of voters always have equal weights.
However, in general it is not possible to restrict the intersection to weighted games respecting
the strict ordering of the voters:
Proposition 3.2. There exists a complete simple game v such that for every representation
v =
[
q1;w1
] ∧ · · · ∧ [qd;wd]
as the intersection of weighted games there exists an index 1 ≤ h ≤ j and two voters i, j from
different equivalence classes of voters with i A j and whi < whj .
PROOF. Let v be the complete simple game with t = 4 equivalence classes of voters, n1 = n2 =
n3 = n4 = 20, and a unique shift maximal losing vector (4, 4, 4, 4). Choose a losing coalition
T ⊆ N with #(T ∩Np) = 4 for all 1 ≤ p ≤ 4 and an index 1 ≤ h ≤ d such that coalition
T is also losing in
[
qh;wh
]
. By eventually scaling the quota qh and the weights wh we assume
wh(T ) ≤ qh − 1. We set ap = wh(T ∩Np) /#(T ∩Np) and xp = wh(Np\T ) /#(Np\T )
for all 1 ≤ p ≤ 4, i.e., the average weight of members of T or non-members of T in each
equivalence class of voters. Note that (0, 9, 0, 0) is a winning vector and choose a coalition
T ∩ N2 ⊆ S1 ⊆ N2 with cardinality 9 and minimum weight. With this, S1 is winning and
qh ≤ wh(S1) ≤ 4a2 + 5x2. Since wh(T ) = 4a1 + 4a2 + 4a3 + 4a4 ≤ qh − 1, we have
4a2 + 5x2 ≥ 4a1 + 4a2 + 4a3 + 4a4 + 1,
which is equivalent to
5x2 − 4a1 − 4a3 − 4a4 ≥ 1. (1)
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Note that (0, 0, 0, 17) is a winning vector and choose T ∩ N4 ⊆ S2 ⊆ N4 with cardinality
17 and minimum weights. With this, S2 is winning and qh ≤ wh(S2) ≤ 4a4 + 13x4. Since
wh(T ) = 4a1 + 4a2 + 4a3 + 4a4 ≤ qh − 1, we have
4a4 + 13x2 ≥ 4a1 + 4a2 + 4a3 + 4a4 + 1,
which is equivalent to
13
4
x4 − a1 − a2 − a3 ≥ 1
4
. (2)
Assuming that whi ≥ whj for all voters i, j from different equivalence classes with i A j, we
especially have a1 ≥ x2 and a3 ≥ x4, which is equivalent to
5a1 − 5x2 ≥ 0 (3)
and
5a3 − 5x4 ≥ 0. (4)
Adding the left and the right hand sides of inequalities (1)-(4) yields
−7
4
x4 − a2 − 4a4 ≥ 1.25,
which is a contradiction, since a2, a4, x4 ≥ 0. Thus, there exist voters i and j from different
equivalence classes of voters with whi < w
h
j and i A j. 
Proposition 3.2 gives a negative answer to the the second question from the conclusion of
[9], where it is additionally assumed that in an arbitrary equivalence class of voters all weights
are equal. The first question from the conclusion of [9] concerns the worst case behavior of the
Boolean dimension of a complete simple game.
A lower bound for worst-case Boolean dimension of a simple or a complete simple game with
n voters can be concluded from a simple counting argument. First note that there are at least
2(
n
bn/2c) > 2
1√
2pin
2n (5)
simple games with n voters, see e.g. [4] for tighter estimates, and at least
2
(√
2
3
pi·2n
)
/(n
√
n) (6)
complete simple games with n voters, see [10].
However, there are not too many possibilities for Boolean combinations:
Proposition 3.3. ([1, Proposition 1])
The total number of Boolean combinations of sweighted games with n voters is at most 2O(sn
2 log(sn)).
So, as observed in [1, Corollary 2] and [4], the Boolean dimension of a simple game with n
voters can be exponential in n. Actually, almost all simple games have an exponential dimension.
Using the same reasoning we can also conclude that the Boolean dimension of a complete simple
game can be exponential in the number of voters. This answers an open question from [9], where
it was shown that the dimension of a complete simple game can be exponential in the number of
voters.
Lemma 3.4. Let v be a complete simple game with t equivalence classes N1, . . . , Nt of voters.
If v has exactly r shift minimal winning vectors m˜1, . . . , m˜r ∈ Nt, then the Boolean dimension
of v is at most rt.
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PROOF. For each index 1 ≤ i ≤ r we will define a complete simple game vi as the intersection
of t weighted games whose unique minimal winning vector coincides with m˜i. The union of
those vi give a representation of v as a Boolean combination of rt weighted games.
So, let m˜i =
(
mi1, . . . ,m
i
t
)
. With this, we define the weighted games vi,j =
[
qi,j , wi,j
]
by
• qi,j =
j∑
h=1
mih;
• wi,jl = 1 if l ∈ ∪jh=1Nh and wl = 0 otherwise.
Now let vi = vi,1 ∧ · · · ∧ vi,t. First we check l A l′ for all l ∈ Nh and all l′ ∈ Nh′ with
1 ≤ h < h′ ≤ t, i.e., the simple game vi is complete. If m˜ = (m1, . . . ,mt) ∈ Nt is a winning
vector in vi, then we have m˜  m˜i. So, if m˜ = (m1, . . . ,mt) is a winning vector in v′, then
there exists an index 1 ≤ i ≤ r such that m˜  m˜i. Since that is exactly the condition for m˜
being a winning vector in v, we have v′ = v. 
Corollary 3.5. The Boolean dimension of a complete simple game v with n voters and t equiva-
lence classes of voters is at most tnt. If t = 2, then the Boolean dimension is at most
⌊
2
3(n+ 3)
⌋
.
PROOF. The number of possible winning vectors (m1, . . . ,mt) is at most nt since 1 ≤ m1 ≤ n
if t = 1 and 0 ≤ mi ≤ n − 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t if t ≥ 2. Thus, the number r of shift minimal
winning vectors also is at most nt, so that we can apply Lemma 3.4 to conclude that the Boolean
dimension of v is at most rt ≤ tnt. For the special case t = 2 we can conclude n ≥ 3r−3 from
[7, Lemma 1]. Thus, the Boolean dimension of v is at most
⌊
2
3(n+ 3)
⌋
, again using Lemma 3.4.

We remark that it is well known that complete simple games with a unique equivalence class of
voters, i.e., t = 1, are weighted. The maximum number r of shift minimal winning vectors of a
complete simple game with n voters can indeed be exponential in n, see [5] for an exact formula
for the maximum value of r (depending on n).
Next we want to consider the dimension of complete simple games. We remark that the exact
dimension is only known for very few simple games. In [8] a large family of simple games
was constructed, where the dimension could be determined exactly. This yields an explicit
description of a sequence of simple games with dimension 2n−o(n).
Proposition 3.6. Let d ≥ 2 be an integer and vd be the complete simple game with t = 2
equivalence classes of voters, where n1 = d and n2 ≥ 2d, and r = 2 shift minimal winning
vectors m˜1 = (2, 0), m˜2 = (0, 4). Then, the dimension of v is exactly d.
PROOF. W.l.o.g. we number the voters so that N1 = {1, . . . , d} and N2 = {d + 1, . . . , n},
where n = n1 + n2 ≥ 3d. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ i we define a weighted game vi =
[
qi;wi
]
by
qi = 8, wii = 3, w
i
j = 5 for all j ∈ N1\{i}, and wij = 2 for all j ∈ N2. Let S be an arbitrary
winning coalition of v. If #(S ∩N1) ≥ 2, then wi(S) ≥ 3 + 5 = 8 = qi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
If #(S ∩N1) ≤ 1, then #S ≥ 4, so that wi(S) ≥ #S · 2 ≥ 8 = qi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d. Thus,
every winning coalition of v is also winning in vi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d. Now let T be a losing
coalition of v. If T ∩ N1 = ∅, then #T ≤ 3, so that wi(T ) = 2 · #T ≤ 6 < 8 = qi for all
1 ≤ i ≤ d. If T ∩N1 6= ∅, then T ∩N1 = {i} for a voter 1 ≤ i ≤ d and #(T\{i}) ≤ 2, so that
wi(T ) = 3+2(#T − 1) ≤ 7 < 8 = qi. Thus, we have v = v1 ∧ · · · ∧ vd, so that the dimension
of v is at most d.
For the other direction we set Ti = {i, d+2i−1, d+2i} for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d. Since Ti∩N1 = {i}
and Ti ∩ N2 = {d + 2i − 1, d + 2i} the coalition Ti is losing in v, where 1 ≤ i ≤ d. For all
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1 ≤ i < i′ ≤ i′
T i,i′ = ({i, i′}, {2i− 1, 2i, 2i′ − 1, 2i′};Ti, Ti′)
is a certificate of non-weightedness. Thus, we can apply Lemma 2.11 to conclude that the
dimension of v is at least d. 
The complete simple games in the prof of Lemma 3.6 generalize the complete simple game
from Example 2.6. The argument for the lower bound for the dimension of v is the same as in
[9, Proposition 2].
Our next aim is to prove that there exist complete simple games with two equivalence classes
of voters whose dimension is exponential in the number of voters. To this end, we have to
introduce some notation from coding theory. A (binary) code is a subsetC of Fn2 whose elements
c ∈ C are called codewords. The Hamming weight wt(c) of a codeword c ∈ C is the number
# {1 ≤ i ≤ n : ci 6= 0} of non-zero coordinates. The Hamming distance d(c, c′) between two
codewords c, c′ ∈ C is the number # {1 ≤ i ≤ n : ci 6= c′i} of coordinates where c and c′ differ.
The minimum Hamming distance d(C) of a code C is the minimum of d(c, c′) for all pairs of
different codewords c, c′ ∈ C. By A(n, 2δ;w) we denote the maximum cardinality of a code
C in Fn2 with minimum Hamming distance d(C) ≥ 2δ such that all codewords c ∈ C have
Hamming weight wt(c) = w. Those codes are called constant weight codes. It is well known
that A(n, 2;w) =
(
n
w
)
and
(
n
w
) · 1n ≤ A(n, 4;w) ≤ ( nw−1) · 1w , see e.g. [3].
Theorem 3.7. If n ≥ 4 is divisible 4, then there exists a complete simple game v with n voters,
t = 2 equivalence classes of voters, and dimension at least
A(n/2, 4;n/4) ≥
(
n/2
n/4
)
· 2
n
≥ 4 · 2
n/2
n2
.
PROOF. Let v be a complete simple game with n = 4k voters, t = 2 equivalence classes of
voters, n1 = n2 = 2k, N1 = {1, . . . , 2k}, N2 = {2k + 1, . . . , 4k}, and r = 2 shift-minimal
winning vectors m˜1 = (k, 0), m˜2 = (0, 2k).
Let C2 be a code in F2k2 with d := A(2k, 4; k) codewords of constant weight k and min-
imum Hamming distance d(C2) ≥ 4. Since #C2 ≤
(
2k
k−1
) · 1k we can choose a code C1 in
F2k2 with A(2k, 4; k) ≤
(
2k
k−1
)
= A(2k, 2; k − 1) codewords of constant weight k − 1 and
minimum Hamming distance d(C1) ≥ 2. To each codeword c ∈ C1 we associate the set
{i : ci = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k}. This gives d sets T 1i ⊆ N1. Similarly, we associate to each codeword
c ∈ C2 the set {i+ 2k : ci = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k}. This gives d sets T 2i ⊆ N2. With this, we set
Ti := T
1
i ∪ T 2i , so that #
(
T i ∩N1
)
= k − 1, # (T i ∩N2) = k, and T i is a losing coalition of
v for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
For each pair (i, j) with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ d we consider the two losing coalitions Ti = T 1i ∪ T 2i
and Tj = T 1j ∪ T 2j . Since the codewords of C1 have Hamming distance at least 2, there exists a
voter ai,j with ai,j ∈ T 1i and ai,j /∈ T 1j . Since the codewords of C2 have Hamming distance at
least 4, there exist two different voters bi,j1 , b
i,j
2 with b
i,j
1 , b
i,j
2 ∈ T 2j and bi,j1 , bi,j2 /∈ T 1j . With this,
T i,j =
(
Ti\
{
ai,j
} ∪ {bi,j1 , bi,j2 } , Tj\{bi,j1 , bi,j2 } ∪ {ai,j} ;Ti, Tj)
is a certificate of non-weightedness. Thus, we can apply Lemma 2.11 to conclude that the
dimension of v is at least d, where d = A(2k, 4; k) = A(n/2, 4;n/4). 
A NOTE ON THE GROWTH OF THE DIMENSION IN COMPLETE SIMPLE GAMES 9
Due to Lemma 3.4 the complete simple game constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.7 has a
Boolean dimension of at most 4. A null voter in a simple game v is a voter i such that v(S) =
v(S\{i}) for all S ⊆ N . By adding up to three null voters, the construction of Theorem 3.7
gives a complete simple game with n voters at dimension at least 4 ·2(n−3)/2/n2 for each n ≥ 4.
We remark that the number of complete simple games with n voters and t = 2 types of voters is
Fib(n+ 6)− (n2 − 4n+ 8), see e.g. [7, Theorem 4], where Fib(n) denotes the nth Fibonacci
number, and at most n
5
15+4n
4 of them are weighted, see [2, Theorem 5.2]. Nevertheless, there are
much more complete simple games with two types of voters than weighted games with two types
of voters we cannot directly use this to lower bound the worst-case behavior of the dimension.
Given a representation v = v1 ∧ · · · ∧ vd of a (complete) simple game v with dimension d as the
intersection of d weighted games, the partition of the voters into equivalence classes typically
differ widely across the weighted games vi.
REFERENCES
[1] P. Faliszewski, E. Elkind, and M. Wooldridge. Boolean combinations of weighted voting games. In Proceedings
of The 8th International Conference on Autonomou s Agents and Multiagent Systems-Volume 1, pages 185–192.
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2009.
[2] J. Freixas and S. Kurz. On minimum integer representations of weighted games. Mathematical Social Sciences,
67:9–22, 2014.
[3] R. Graham and N. Sloane. Lower bounds for constant weight codes. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
26(1):37–43, 1980.
[4] A. D. Korshunov. Monotone boolean functions. Russian Mathematical Surveys, 58(5):929–1001, 2003.
[5] I. Krohn and P. Sudho¨lter. Directed and weighted majority games. Zeitschrift fu¨r Operations Research,
42(2):189–216, 1995.
[6] S. Kurz and S. Napel. Dimension of the Lisbon voting rules in the EU council: a challenge and new world
record. Optimization Letters, 10(6):1245–1256, 2016.
[7] S. Kurz and N. Tautenhahn. On Dedekinds problem for complete simple games. International Journal of Game
Theory, 42(2):411–437, 2013.
[8] M. Olsen, S. Kurz, and X. Molinero. On the construction of high-dimensional simple games. In Proceedings of
the Twenty-second European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 880–885. IOS Press, 2016.
[9] L. ODwyer and A. Slinko. Growth of dimension in complete simple games. Mathematical Social Sciences,
90:2–8, 2017.
[10] U. N. Peled and B. Simeone. Polynomial-time algorithms for regular set-covering and threshold synthesis.
Discrete Applied Mathematics, 12(1):57–69, 1985.
[11] A. D. Taylor, W. S. Zwicker, and W. Zwicker. Simple games: Desirability relations, trading, pseudoweightings.
Princeton University Press, 1999.
Fakulta¨t fu¨r Mathematik, Physik und Informatik, Universita¨t Bayreuth, Germany, email: sascha.kurz@uni-bayreuth.de,
tel: +49 921 557353.
